The advisor assessed the client’s proposed production plans and compared the carbon intensities of proposed SAF products to voluntary SAF buyers’ procurement standards. Using publicly available data tools, the advisor found that potential methane leakage rates for the client’s proposed blue hydrogen approach were likely too high for many SAF buyers’ procurement standards. Airlines, for example, generally want a minimum 60% carbon intensity reduction in SAF relative to Jet A (i.e., kerosene-based conventional jet fuel); many SAF buyers — especially in the EU — seek 85%. Methane leakages could increase the e-SAF’s carbon intensity, thereby screening out certain offtakers and lowering revenues for the company.
Similarly for HEFA, the advisor showed that crop-based residues from soybeans can damage the environmental profile of the final SAF product and hinder its chances of selling to many customers. To credibly pursue HEFA, the client would need to find locations nearer to other, stable, lower-carbon feedstock supplies, such as canola oil, animal fats (e.g., tallow), and other waste oils and greases.
“There’s no point spending all that capex to be ‘51% SAF’ because SAF buyers will not be willing to pay for something that is just ‘SAF on paper’,” says a project manager from the advisory firm. “There are other SAF options that achieve lower carbon intensities for half the capex.”
The client assessment also showed that, although there were federal subsidies, it would be difficult to match feedstock requirements with the chosen production technology in the region where the client was originally planning its e-SAF facilities. The client’s main facility in the United States was in a region with a regulated electric utility that had planned for only sparse growth in renewables, putting any power-to-liquids projects at risk.
Meanwhile, local access to waste cooking oil as a feedstock for HEFA-based production was also limited since most of it was already accounted for. Project finance bankers have flagged that feedstock contracts for HEFA SAF projects must be strong, especially since feedstock is traditionally limited and weak feedstock contracts (e.g., short tenor and/or relatively low penalties for suppliers who break the contract) mean suppliers could easily switch to other, higher-paying customers and leave the original project stranded.
Banks may encounter similar complications after conducting their own due diligence on a client. Client transition assessments can be resource-intensive and, given bankers’ time constraints, bankers could first reference readily available third-party information before investing in proprietary data and/or consultants. Leading banks are also developing in-house climate and decarbonization advisors to serve the firm. If a bank is well-versed in sectoral decarbonization strategies, it could have played the role of the advisor in this SAF case, identifying offtake and feedstock risks in the client’s proposed SAF production plans during its standard planning phase.